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AFTER THE ICC OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR’S 2016
POLICY PAPER ON CASE SELECTION AND PRIORITISA-
TION: TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL CRIME OF ECO-
CIDE?
ABSTRACT. The 2016 Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court
(ICC) policy paper on case selection and prioritization is a significant development in
that it highlights the possible role of the ICC in prosecuting environmental damage,
illegal natural resource exploitation and land grabbing. For obvious reasons, how-
ever, the ICC Office of the Prosecutor policy paper could not expand the court’s
current jurisdiction over ecocide which is dependent on a formal amendment to the
ICC Statute and the policy paper is only an internal policy document. But more
fundamentally it has been predicted that the 2016 ICC Office of the Prosecutor may
signify the revitalization of the debate on how an international crime of ecocide
could be conceptualised under international law and ultimately whether the ICC
should have a broader jurisdiction over ecocide. This article aims to critically eval-
uate how a crime of ecocide could be conceptualised under international law, as well
as to assess the limitations of conceptualising ecocide based on the narrow definition
of the existing crimes under the ICC Statute. Moreover, this article aims to critically
evaluate developments in past three and half years following the adoption 2016 OTP
Policy Paper, and notes that the practice of the OTP in dealing with recent national
communications and the ICC case law itself to date have not signified a considerable
shift in interpreting the law in cases involving environmental damage, illegal natural
resources exploitation and land grabbing. Therefore, they have done little so far to
clarify the scope of the court’s existing jurisdiction over ‘‘ecocide’’.
I INTRODUCTION
On 15 September 2016 the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the
International Criminal Court (ICC) issued a policy paper on case
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selection and prioritization, which highlights a possible role of the
ICC in prosecuting environmental damage, illegal natural resource
exploitation and land grabbing committed in context of the existing
crimes under the Rome Statute.1 This is not the first initiative to
galvanize the debate over the creation of a crime of ecocide in
international law. In 2010, Polly Higgins, a leading advocate for the
recognition of an international crime of ecocide, proposed that the
UN Law Commission defined ecocide as the ‘‘extensive damage to, of
or loss of ecosystem(s) of a given territory, whether by human agency
or by other causes, to such an extent that peaceful enjoyment by the
inhabitants of that territory has been or will be severely diminished.’’2
A more concrete step towards the establishment of a crime of ‘‘eco-
cide’’ (although limited to the European context) happened following
a European Citizens’’ Initiative which was launched in June 2012
aimed at achieving a joint EU position on the crime ecocide with the
view of ‘‘end[ing] ecocide in Europe’’ and for adoption of a ‘‘draft
ecocide Directive.’’3 Yet since the initiative failed to reach one million
signatures in at least seven Member States required to instigate the
Commission to adopt a legislative proposal,4 the initiative was
withdrawn in January 2013.5 The Citizen’s initiative was debated
subsequently by the European Parliament’s Environmental, Legal,
Agricultural and Fisheries Committee in February 2015, but this has
not led to concrete steps towards adoption of a ‘‘draft Ecocide
1 See Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper On Case Selection And Prioritisation,
15 September 2016, https://www.Icc-Cpi.Int/Itemsdocuments/20160915_Otp-Policy_
Case-Selection_Eng.Pdf (accessed 20 March 2020).
2 See further, Polly Higgins, Eradicating Ecocide: Laws and Governance to Stop the
Destruction of the Planet (2nd ed, 2015) and http://eradicatingecocide.com (accessed
21 June 2018). See also the Draft Ecocide Act (2011) used in the Mock Trial in the
UK Supreme Court in 2011, Art 12, http://eradicatingecocide.com (accessed on 15
March 2020).
3 See further http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/initiatives/obsolete/de
tails/2012/000012 ; and European Parliament to discuss End Ecocide initiative, 25th
February 2015, ‘‘The Week Ahead 23 February – 01 March 2015 Plenary and com
mittee meetings week’’ at www.europarl.europa.eu/pdfs/news/ (accessed on 24 June
2018).
4 Article 11 (4) TEU.
5 184,000 signatures were obtained. See further http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-in
itiative/public/initiatives/obsolete/details/2012/000012 (accessed on 20 March 2020).
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Directive’’6 given that the European Commission holds the exclusive
power of legislative initiative and the limited role of the European
Parliament to instigate the Commission to start legislative action.
Despite the challenges faced by those initiatives, they provide evi-
dence of an increased interest from citizens, politicians and the ICC
itself – as evidenced by the 2016 OTP policy paper – in redefining the
limits of the court’s jurisdiction which could ultimately lead to the
creation of an international crime of ecocide.7
The four crimes that currently fall under the jurisdiction of the
ICC are genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime
of aggression.8 Thus at present the scope for the prosecution of
environmental crime before the International Criminal Court (ICC)
is very limited, given that the Rome Statute (1998)9 primarily only
recognises the court’s jurisdiction for certain instances of environ-
mental damage in the context of an armed conflict falling under the
definition of war crimes, such as the oil spill caused by the Iraqi forces
in the Persian Gulf during the Gulf War in 1991.10 Ultimately it will
be for future ICC review conferences to decide whether ecocide (or
other international and transnational crimes, such as terrorism and
drug trafficking) should be included in the ICC Statute.11
Although the 2016 ICC OTP policy paper on case selection and
prioritization is a significant development in that it highlights the
6 It should be noted that a EC directive 2008/99/EC on the protection of the
environment through criminal law (‘‘environmental crime directive’’) was adopted in
November 2008. This directive aims to harmonise the environmental criminal laws of
the EUMember States, but falls short of creating a crime of ecocide in the EU. For a
discussion of the environmental crime directive see further for example Grazia M.
Vagliasindi, ‘‘The EU Environmental Crime Directive’’, in Andrey Farmer, Michael
Faure and Grazia M. Vagliasindi (eds), Environmental Crime in Europe (Hart, 2018)
and Pereira, R. ’Towards Effective Implementation of the EU Environmental Crime
Directive? The Case of Illegal Waste Management and Trafficking Offences’ Review
of European, Comparative and International Environmental Law 26 (2) (2017).
7 See ibid.
8 See Article 5, Rome Statute. The crime of aggression was defined by the ICC
review conference in 2010. See Resolution RC/Res.6; adopted at the 13th plenary
meeting, on 11 June 2010, by consensus.
9 UN General Assembly, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last
amended 2010), 17 July 1999.
10 See further, Karen Hulme, War Torn Environment: Interpreting the Legal
Threshold, Martinus Nijhoff (2004).
11 See A. Cassese, P. Gaeta, and J. Jones, The Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court A Commentary (2002), 1903.
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inclination of the OTP to prosecute international crimes involving
illegal natural resource exploitation, land grabbing and environmental
damage,12 the policy paper could not expand the court’s jurisdiction
over ecocide which is dependent on an amendment to the ICC Statute.
Still, the policy paper is highly significant in that it outlines a policy of
case selection and prioritisation which emphasises the seriousness of
environmental damage in the context of the existing crimes under the
Rome Statute. In particular, it recognises that land grabbing, illegal
exploitation of natural resources and destruction of the environment
are ‘‘serious crime under national law.’’13 (emphasis added). It also
states that ‘‘the Office will give particular consideration to prosecuting
Rome Statute crimes’’ (emphasis added) that are committed by means
of ‘‘destruction of the environment, the illegal exploitation of natural
resources or the illegal dispossession of land.’’14 Hence it is to be ex-
pected that environmental damage and illegal natural resources
exploitation will become important parameters in future decisions of
the ICC prosecutor to investigate and eventually bring prosecutions in
the context of the existing core crimes falling under the ICC jurisdic-
tion. In this fashion, one of the central goals of the Policy Paper is to
provide guiding principles for ‘‘the exercise of prosecutorial discretion
in the selection and prioritisation of cases for investigation and pros-
ecution and preliminary examinations,’’15 with reference to the ICC
Rules of Procedure and Evidence16 and the internal regulations
adopted by the Office of the Prosecutor.17
The 2016 OTC Policy Paper follows a November 2013 OTC Policy
Paper on preliminary examinations that used a similar wording 18
except that the 2016 Policy Paper makes an explicit reference to
12 Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper On Case Selection And Prioritisation (n. 1)
paras. 7 , 40 and 41.
13 Ibid, Para. 7
14 Ibid, Para. 41.
15 The Office of Public Prosecutor Policy Paper (n.1), at 3. On the role of pre-
liminary examinations, see C. Stahn, Damned if you Do, Damned if You Don’t:
Challenges and Critiques of Preliminary Examinations at the ICC, 15 Journal of
International Criminal Justice, vol. 15 Issue 3.
16 Assembly of State Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ICC-ASP/1/3, at 10 (Sept. 3–10, 2002)
17 See e.g. Regulation of the Office of the Prosecutor, ICC-BD/05-01-09, 23rd
April 2009, available at http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/a97226/pdf/ (accessed 22
September 2019).
18 OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, 1 November 2013, x 65.
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crimes committed ‘‘by means of, or that result in: the destruction of
the environment, the illegal exploitation of natural resources or the
illegal dispossession of land.’’19 As will be further discussed below,
the Global Diligence LLP Communication brought on behalf of the
victims (‘‘Filing Victims’’) against Cambodia, although at the time of
writing not having triggered preliminary examinations by the OTP, is
largely regarded to have inspired the adoption of the 2016 OTC
Policy Paper. The 2016 OTP has been welcomed by some commen-
tators who noted that although not binding, the Policy Paper’s focus
on environmental harm as relevant to the OTP’s decision to prosecute
has improved the possibility of entrenching a ‘‘green’’ approach to
interpreting the ICC Statute.20 Moreover, the OTP’s Policy Paper has
been praised because of its potential to enhance the ICC’s ability to
deliver justice to victims of environmental harm and to produce
incidental benefits in terms of environmental protection and which
could also be used as tool to combat climate change.21
This article aims to critically evaluate how a crime of ecocide could
be conceptualised under international law and in particular to assess
the limitations of conceptualizing the crime of ecocide based on the
narrow definition of the existing crimes under the ICC Statute, as
envisaged in the OTC’s 2016 policy paper. Further, this article will
evaluate the OTP practice and ICC jurisprudence in the three and
half years since the adoption 2016 OTP Policy Paper in order to
assess whether they have marked a considerable shift from their
previous positions in handling cases involving environmental dam-
age, illegal natural resources exploitation and land grabbing.
The second section of this paper begins with a discussion of how a
crime of ecocide could be conceptualised under international law,
taking account of historical developments including the existing
international initiatives such as those proposed or adopted by the
International Law Commission, the ICC and other international
institutions, as well as the legal nature (international or transna-
19 Nadia Bernaz, An Analysis of the ICC Office of the Prosecutor’s Policy Paper
on Case Selection and Prioritization from the Perspective of Business and Human
Rights, JICJ 15 (2017), 527^542
20 Rosemary Mwanza, ‘‘Enhancing Accountability for Environmental Damage
under International Law: Ecocide of a Legal Fulfilment of Ecological Integrity’’,
Melbourne Journal of International Law 19 (2018).
21 Luigi Prosperi and Jacopo Terrosi, ‘‘Embracing the Human Factor’: Is There
New Impetus at the ICC for Conceiving and Prioritizing Intentional Environmental
Harms as Crimes against Humanity?’’ (2017) 15 Journal of International Criminal
Justice 509. See also, ibid.
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tional) and legal elements of an eventual crime of ecocide under the
ICC Statute. This is followed by the third section which scrutinizes
the impact of the ICC OTP 2016 policy paper on prosecutorial dis-
cretion and highlights the limitations in relying on the ICC’s existing
jurisdiction for the prosecution of ecocide. Section 4 presents the
concluding remarks.
II CONCEPTUALISING A CRIME OF ‘‘ECOCIDE’’ UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW
This section discusses how a crime of ecocide could be conceptualized
under international law. It starts by looking into the historical
developments aimed at creating an international crime of ecocide and
whether ecocide could be regarded as an international or transna-
tional crime. Finally, this section analyses the legal elements of an
international crime of ecocide (in particular the mens rea and the
actus reus elements) and ends with a discussion of whether certain
human rights violations may fulfill the required elements of a crime of
ecocide.
2.1 The Origins and Historical Developments Towards the Establish-
ment of an International Crime of Ecocide
The origins of the term ‘‘ecocide’’ can be found in reactions to the use
of the ‘‘Agent Orange’’ in the Vietnam war.22 Arthur Galston, fol-
lowing the 1970 conference on ‘‘War Crimes and the American
conscience’’, condemned Operation Ranch Hand and asked the
international community, through the United Nations, to condemn
and punish ecocide.23 In 1973 Richard Falk called for the develop-
ment of new legal instruments namely an International Convention
on the Crime of Ecocide and a Draft Protocol on Environmental
Warfare. Although these developments ultimately culminated in the
adoption of the 1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or
22 See D. Zierler, Invention of Ecocide: Agent Orange,Vietnam, and the Scientists
Who Changed the Way We Think about the Environment (University of Georgia
Press, 2011). See further in detail, Eliana Cusato, ‘‘Beyond Symbolism: Problems and
Prospects of Prosecuting Environmental Destruction before the ICC’’, 15 Journal of
International Criminal Justice 3 (2017), pp. 491–507.
23 Richard Falk ‘‘Environmental Warfare and Ecocide: Facts, Appraisal, and
Proposals’’ 4 Bulletin of Peace Proposals (1973).
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Any Hostile Uses of Environmental Modification (ENMOD)24, a
global ‘‘ecocide’’ convention with a broader scope beyond armed
conflicts was never formally adopted. It should be noted that EN-
MOD itself is only of indirect relevance to international criminal law
as it does not impose individual criminal responsibility for breaches
of its provisions. Indeed, ENMOD is primarily useful as an inter-
pretive aid for other provisions and principles under the ICC Statute
that do entail individual criminal responsibility.25
The first initiative by the International Law Commission calling
for the criminalisation of offences against the environment was the
Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind
(1954), adopted in second reading in 1996.26 The original draft code
recognised ‘‘widespread environmental damage’’ as a ‘‘crime against
the peace and security of mankind’’ which could be defined as a war
crime.27 Significantly, the draft code envisaged penal protection un-
der article 26 against ‘‘wilful and severe damage to the environ-
ment.’’28 It thus identified widespread environmental damage as a
crime against the peace and security of mankind as a prerequisite for
establishment of an international crime. It should be noted that in
contrast to Article 22 (on ‘‘war crimes’’) of the same draft code,
article 26 was not limited to the context of an armed conflict.29
However, during the second reading of the draft code the special
rapporteur recommended significant changes to Article 22, and the
deletion of Article 26.30 This is because Article 22 received little
24 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Envi-
ronmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD), opened for signature 18 May 1977,
31 U.S.T. 333, 1108, U.N.T.S. 151.
25 Matthew Gillet, ‘‘Environmental Damage and International Criminal Law’’, in
Sebastien Jodoin and Marie-Claire Condonier Segger (eds), Sustainable Develop-
ment, International Criminal Justice and Treaty Interpretation (CUP, 2013)
26 ILC Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind (1996),
adopted by the International Law Commission at its Forty-Eighth Session. The ILC
provisionally adopted a set of articles in 1991 which revised and updated the 1954
Draft Code.
27 See ibid, article 22 (emphasis added).
28 See ibid, articles 22 and 26.
29 Compare it with Article 55 of the Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions. Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts of 1977
(Protocol I), Article 55 (1.)
30 Stephen McCaffrey, ‘‘Crimes Against the Environment’’, in Cherif M. Bassiouni
(ed), International Criminal Law (1996), at 1104.
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support in government comments on the draft adopted on first
reading, and Article 26 faced strong opposition from member gov-
ernments who have expressed doubt over whether environmental is-
sues can affect the peace and security of humankind.31 So the final
version of the Draft Code adopted in 1996 has a limited scope to the
criminalization of environmental offences in that it only applies to
war crimes. The position of some national governments that have led
to the deletion of Article 26 of the draft code is at odds with the
expanding interpretation of ‘‘peace and security of mankind’’ given
by the UN Security Council,32 and with the development of the no-
tion of ecological security.33,34 The adoption of Article 26 would have
marked an important step for achieving of a broader international
consensus on a definition of ‘‘ecocide’’ under international law. As
pointed out by Mark Gray, ‘‘though only certain instances of ecocide
would therefore fall within article 26 [of the Draft Code], it lays the
foundation for wider recognition, particularly should the link to war
crimes disappear.’’35
Another significant development was the proposal by the ILC to
include in its Draft Articles on State Responsibility specific provi-
sions which could have established the basis for an international
crime of ecocide. The Draft articles stated that ‘‘the breach of rules
concerning the environment may constitute (…) in some cases, an
31 Ibid. See A/CN.4/448 and Yearbook of the ILC 1993, Vol. II, Pt. 1. Documents
of the 45th session. A/CN.4/SER.A/1993/Add.1 (Part 1) (includes A/CN.4/448 and
Add.1); and the discussions in the Sixth Committee (Legal) of the General Assembly
addressing the draft Code: 12th – 25th meeting; summary records: A/C.6/50/SR.12
to A/C.6/50/SR.25. See further, Anja Gauger, Mai Pouye Rabatel-Fernel, Louise
Kulbicki, Damien Short and Polly Higgins, ‘‘Ecocide is the Missing 5th Crime Against
Peace’’ July 2012, Human Rights Consortium, School of Advanced Study,
University of London.
32 Rene Provost, ‘‘International Criminal Environmental Law’’, in G. Good-Gill
and S. Talmon (eds) The Reality of International Law: Essays in Honour of Ian
Brownlie (Oxford 1999), at 444.
33 See for example Jon Barnett, The Meaning of Environmental Security: Eco-
logical Politics and Policy in the New Security Era (Zed Books, 2001).
34 See art. 20 (g), ILC Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of
Mankind.
35 Mark Gray, ‘‘The International Crime of Ecocide’’, 26 California Western
International Law Journal 2 (1996) at 331.
RICARDO PEREIRA
international crime.’’36 The seriousness of environmental offences is a
crucial element in the ILC original definition of international crimes
involving environmental damage. Indeed, according to Article 19 (3)
(d) of the Draft Articles ‘‘a serious breach of an international obli-
gation of essential importance for the safeguarding and preservation
of the human environment’’ could constitute an international crime,
such as ‘‘massive pollution of the atmosphere and the high seas.’’37
Hence according to the original ILC Draft Articles an international
crime could include the serious breach by a State of an obligation
essential for the protection of fundamental world interests. This
would include peace and security of mankind, human rights, and
safeguarding and preservation of the human environment.38
The Articles on State Responsibility finally adopted in November
2001 by the ILC in its fifty-third session omit the reference to inter-
national crimes as triggering the criminal responsibility of States for
environmental offences.39 Moreover, the examples given in the ILC’s
accompanying commentaries to the Articles – although they ‘‘may
not be exhaustive’’ – do not include harm to the environment of the
kind listed in the former Article 19 of the Draft Articles on State
Responsibility.40 Instead of recognizing environmental crime as
international crimes, the final version of the 2001 ILC Articles
identify the legal consequences of the breach of peremptory norms of
international law, but do not state exhaustively what those norms
are.41 So it became clear that the original proposal for codification of
the international crime of ‘‘ecocide’’ was not accepted by all members
of the Commission, with ultimate effect that ‘‘massive pollution’’ or
‘‘other environmental catastrophes’’ are not listed as examples of serious
breaches in the 2001 Draft Articles or in the accompanying ILC com-
36 See ILC’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful
Acts ‘‘1954 ILC Report’’ (A/CN.4/88) Report of the International Law Commission
Covering the Work of its Sixth Session, 3 28 July 1954, Official Records of the
General Assembly, Ninth Session, Supplement No. 9 (A/2693);
37 Article 19 (3) (d) ibid.
38 Pereira, R. Environmental Criminal Liability and Enforcement in European
and International Law’ (Brill, 2015). See also, Gray (1996) above n. 35, at 266–267.
39 See 2001 International Law Commission (ILC) Draft Articles on the Respon-
sibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts 48, Report of the ILC to the United
Nations General Assembly adopted in the fifty-third sesssion, UN Doc. A/56/10
(2001).
40 See Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
with commentaries 2001, Artilcle 40, commentary 6, at 286.
41 See ILC draft articles on state responsibility, Articles 40 and 41. Ibid.
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mentaries. Despite the restrictive interpretation of the ILC in its defini-
tion of the responsibility of States for international crimes, it is possible
to interpret the adopted provisions (i.e. Articles 40 and 41) recognizing
the existence of ‘‘serious breaches’’ as also leading to state responsibility
for environmental damage. This is because the ILC Articles on State
Responsibility are open-ended and non-exhaustive; and therefore they
were not supposed to exclude the development of rules under interna-
tional law detailing the consequences of serious breaches which ‘‘fulfill
the criteria for peremptory norms under article 53.’’42
It should be emphasised that the original ILC draft articles were
concerned with State responsibility (as opposed to individual
responsibility), which explains the resistance by the members of the
ILC to recognise the criminal liability of States for ecocide.43
Whereas international criminal law has traditionally recognised the
principle of individual criminal responsibility, the principle of crim-
inal liability of States is not yet developed in interstate or jurispru-
dential practices.44 In this regard, Robert McLaughlin argues that it
is paradoxical that whereas international environmental law is based
on the predominant role of states and their responsibility for envi-
ronmental harm, the subjects of ICC jurisdiction would be necessarily
non-state international actors.45 He further notes that ‘‘an environ-
mental Pinochet would be subject to ICC jurisdiction, while an
environmental Chile would remain apparently insulated.’’46 On the
other hand, McCaffrey questioned whether ‘‘an entire population of a
nation should be treated as international criminals because of the
actions of their leaders.’’47 So while States remain responsible under
international law for the environmental harm caused by individual
actors who operate in their territory under the general rules of State
42 Ibid, commentaries to Article 40, commentary 6
43 See further, ibid. See also, Pereira, n. 38 above.
44 See Christian Tomuschat, ‘‘International Crimes by States: an Endangered
Species?’’, in K. Wellens ed., International Law: Theory and Practice – Essays in
Honour of Eric Suy, Martinus Nijhoff (1998) at 259; Geoff Gilbert, ‘‘The Criminal
Responsibility of States’’ 39 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 345
(1990). Theodor Meron, ‘‘Is International LawMoving Towards Criminalization?’’ 9
European Journal of International Law (1998) at 21.
45 Robert Mclaughlin, ‘‘Improving Compliance: Making Non-State International
Actors Responsible for Environmental Crimes’’, 11 Colo. J. Int’L Envtl. L. & Pol’Y
377 (2000) at 389.
46 Ibid.
47 McCaffrey, above no. 30, at 1028.
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responsibility, the likelihood that criminal liability will eventually be
attached to States under international law remains remote. This is
reflected in the ICC Statute itself, which expressly states that ‘‘no
provision in this Statute relating to individual responsibility shall
affect the responsibility of states under international law.’’48
Despite the failure of those ILC initiatives in upholding a legal basis
for an international crime of ecocide in the peacetime context, a war
crime involving environmental damage is embedded inArticles 35(3), 55
and 85(3)(b) of the 1977 Additional Protocol 1 to the 1949 Geneva
conventions.49 Article 35(3) ofAdditional Protocol I prohibits the use of
‘‘methods ormeans ofwarfarewhichare intended, ormaybe expected to
cause, widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural envi-
ronment.’’50 This prohibition is also present in Article 55(1) of Addi-
tionalProtocol I.51 Several States indicated that they considered the rules
in Articles 35(3) and 55(1) of Additional Protocol I to be part of cus-
tomary international law.52 Article 8 (2) (b) (iv) of the ICC Statute53 is
similar to the grave breach provision of Article 85 (3) (b) of Additional
Protocol 1, except for the fact that it includes ‘‘widespread, long-term
and severe damage to the environment’’, whereas the Additional Pro-
tocol I does not; and it states that damage, loss or damage must be
‘‘clearly’’ excessive, while the Additional Protocol I does not.54
48 Art. 25 (4) ICC Statute.
49 See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I),
opened for signature 12 December 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1391. See also, Article 2(4) of the
Protocol III of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.
50 Additional Protocol I, Article 35(3) (adopted by consensus) (cited in Vol. II, Ch.
14, § 145).
51 See Rule 45. Causing Serious Damage to the Natural Environment, ICRC
Customary IHL https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chap
ter14_rule45#Fn_4C6D6F6B_00003.
52 See, e.g., the statements of Germany (ibid., § 231), Islamic Republic of Iran
(ibid., § 236) and Kuwait (ibid., § 245) in relation to Iraq in 1991 and the statement of
Yugoslavia in relation to the NATO bombing of a petrochemical complex in 1999
(ibid., § 271). In their submissions to the International Court of Justice in the Nuclear
Weapons case and Nuclear Weapons (WHO) case. Ibid.
53 It should be noted that could also note the ICC’s Preamble, with the suggestion
that the preamble reference to ‘‘well-being of the world’’ denotes a reference to the
protection of the natural environment as one of the recognised protected values of
the Statute. See commentary at pp 8–9 in Triffterer/Ambos, infra.
54 Triffterer and Ambos (eds), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court: A Commentary (Third ed., 2018) at 245.
AFTER THE ICC OTP 2016 POLICY PAPER
The ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law Study
also addresses the principles of customary international law that
impose prohibitions on damaging the environment. Rule 43 clarifies
that the international humanitarian law principles of distinction,
military necessity, and proportionality apply to attacks against the
natural environment resulting from military operations.55 Moreover,
the destruction of the environment during hostilities in the absence of
any military objective is criminal, just as the destruction of civilian
objects is criminal.56
Yet even though serious environmental damage often accom-
panies armed conflicts and there is a well-established interna-
tional legal framework governing environmental damage in
armed conflicts, so far there have been very few prosecutions for
environmental damage since the Second World War.57 The dis-
crepancy between the seriousness and scale of damage to the
environment in armed conflicts and the absence of individual
accountability is of considerable concern.58 Indeed, despite the
serious environmental damage that are inflicted in the course of
armed conflicts, it is disappointing that Article 35 (3) of Addi-
tional Protocol I has not been the subject of prosecutions in
international tribunals.59
2.2 The ‘‘Inter-’’ and ‘‘Trans-’’ Nationality of Ecocide
Another obstacle to the conceptualisation of ‘‘ecocide’’ is the extent
to which it should reflect the distinction between ‘‘crimes under
international law’’ and ‘‘transnational crimes.’’ Indeed, a doctrinal
distinction is made between ‘‘supranational crimes’’ (or ‘‘transna-
tional crimes’’ such as transnational environmental crimes), and
‘‘crimes under international law’’ which are those international
crimes subject to the jurisdiction of an international criminal court or
54 Triffterer and Ambos (eds), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court: A Commentary (Third ed., 2018) at 245.
55 Henckaerts and L.Doswald-Beck (eds.), Customary International Humanitar-
ian Law (2005) (‘‘ICRC Rules’’).
56 Ibid.
57 See further, Gillet, above note 25.
58 Ibid.
59 Henckaerts and L.Doswald-Beck (eds.), Customary International Humanitar-
ian Law (2005) (‘‘ICRC Rules’’).
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tribunal.60 Although those crimes which have an impact on one or
more States (including transboundary environmental crimes) could
be broadly considered international crimes, arguably environmental
crimes cannot be defined as international crimes in the strict sense as
understood under international criminal law which currently only
recognises war crime, crimes against humanity, genocide, torture,
crimes of aggression61 (and according to some definitions, also
international terrorism and maritime piracy), as international crimes.
This allows one to distinguish crimes of cross-boundary effects, such
as drug or human trafficking or illegal movement of hazardous waste,
and other crimes which are susceptible to adjudication by an inter-
national criminal tribunal, such as the International Criminal Court,
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) or
the Special Court for Sierra Leone.62
According to Antonio Cassese and his co-authors, the existence of
an international crime requires the following criteria to be met cu-
mulatively: a) violation of international customary rules as well as
treaty provisions; b) the rules are intended to protect values impor-
tant to the whole international community and consequently bind all
states and individuals; c) a universal interest in repressing those
crimes; and d) if the perpetrator has acted in an official capacity (i.e.
de jure or de facto state official), the state on whose behalf he has
performed the prohibited act may be barred from claiming immunity
to those state officials from civil or criminal jurisdiction of foreign
states accruing under customary international law to state officials
acting in the exercise of their functions.63 It would not be particularly
challenging for a definition of ecocide to fulfill the first three crite-
ria.64 Indeed, there is an increasing recognition that some serious
types of transnational environmental offences impact on the peace
and security of mankind and violate ‘‘customary rules’’ and ‘‘uni-
60 See also R. Cryer. H. Friman, D. Robinson and E. Wilmshurst, An Introduction
to International Criminal Law and Procedure (CUP, 2011) at 4–6; and N. Boister,
‘‘An Introduction to Transnational Criminal Law’’ (OUP, 2018).
61 Following a definition to the crime of aggression given during the ICC review
conference in 2010. See Resolution RC/Res.6; adopted at the 13th plenary meeting,
on 11 June 2010, by consensus.
62 Antonio Cassese, O. Gaeta, L. Baig, M. Fan, Gosnesll, and A Whiting,.
Cassese’s International Criminal Law (Oxford, 2013) at 21.
63 Ibid, at 20.
64 Ibid.
AFTER THE ICC OTP 2016 POLICY PAPER
versal values.’’ Significantly, the UN Security Council recognized in
2007 that climate change poses a threat to peace and security of
mankind.65 This view was shared by the Extinction Rebellion protest
group who have advocated recently for the ICC to play a role in
prosecuting climate change-related damage.66 Moreover, the Security
Council has recognised that attacks on the environment have con-
sequences in terms of international peace and security.67 And
according to Natalie Klein, illegal, unregulated and unreported
(IUU) fishing is not only an environmental concern, and should be
regarded as a maritime security concern of coastal states.68
On the other hand, the fourth criterion concerning the immunity
of state officials is of limited applicability to the rules of international
criminal law in the context of international crimes involving envi-
ronmental damage, as government officials will only in limited cir-
cumstances be directly responsible for environmental damage
(possibly, for example, in the context of environmental crimes com-
mitted by state-owned companies or when environmental licenses are
fraudulently issued).69 This of course does not mean that the ICC
jurisdiction is limited to international crimes committed by state
officials in a governmental capacity (although war crimes, genocide
and crimes against humanity are often committed by states officials).
65 Following the Security Council meeting on ‘‘Energy, Security and Climate’’
held on 17 April 2007. See Security Council Holds First-Ever Debate On Impact Of
Climate Change On Peace, Security, Hearing Over 50 Speakers, 5663rd Meeting, SC/
9000, 17 April 2007. Resolution adopted by the General Assembly [without reference
to a Main Committee (A/63/L.8/Rev.1 and Add.1)] 63/281. Climate change and its
possible security implications, Sixty-third session, Agenda item 107. See also, ibid.
66 See Harry Cockburn, Climate Change Activists who occupied International
Criminal Court arrested by the Dutch Police, The Independent (16 April 2019), at
https://www.independent.co.uk/environment/climate-change-protest-extinction-re
bellion-international-criminal-court-the-hague-a8872621.html (accessed 22 Septem
ber 2019). See generally, K. Davies and T. Riddell, The Warming War: How Climate
Change is Creating Threats to International Peace and Security, 30 Georgetown
Environmental Law Review 1 (2017).
67 L.A. Malone, ‘‘Green Helmets: A Conceptual Framework for Security Council
Authority in Environmental Emergencies’’, (1995) 17 Michigan Journal of Interna-
tional Law 515;N. Schrijver, ‘‘International Organization for Environmental Secu-
rity’’, (1989) 20 Security Dialogue 115.
68 See Natalie Klein, Maritime Security and the Law of the Sea (OUP, 2011) at 97.
69 See also, Pereira, above note 38.
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As argued by Robert Cryer et al, with exception of the crime of
aggression, the status of the perpetrator is almost always irrelevant to
define international criminal responsibility.70
Yet ‘‘international environmental crime’’ broadly defined (or ‘‘latu
sensu’’) may include illegal trade in wildlife;71 illegal trade in ozone-
depleting substances; 72 and dumping and illegal transport of various
kinds of hazardous wastes,73 since there are international conventions
requiring signatory parties to introduce, among others, penal mea-
sures against violations of those agreements. It is thus possible to
broadly define certain types of environmental damage as interna-
tional environmental crimes74 ‘‘(whenever) there is movement of
goods across boundaries (i.e. smuggling etc) or a transboundary
impact to offences.’’75 Those offences could be classified as ‘‘supra-
national crimes’’ or ‘‘transnational crimes,’’ to be distinguished from
‘‘crimes under international law’’ which are subject to the jurisdiction
of an international criminal tribunal.76 It should be noted that illegal
logging is not covered by any international convention establishing
punitive measures and could not be considered ‘‘international envi-
ronmental crimes’’ even in this broader sense. As regards illegal
fishing, although no binding international agreements require states
to criminalise it, the FAO has implemented a number of initiatives in
70 R. Cryer. H. Friman, D. Robinson and E. Wilmshurst, An Introduction to
International Criminal Law and Procedure (Cambridge, 2011) at 28. See also Leila
Nadya Sadat, Crimes Against Humanity in the Modern Age, Volume 107, Issue 2
April 2013 , pp. 334–377 addressing this question in the context of crimes against
humanity.
71 Washington Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of
Fauna and Flora (CITES), 993 UNTS 243, adopted on 03 March 1973; in force 07
January 1975.
72 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, opened for
signature 16 September 1987, entry into force 01 January 1989, 1522 UNTS 3.
73 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous
Waste and Other Waste and their Disposal, 1673 UNTS 126. 22 March 1989; 05 May
1992.
74 See also, Ludwik Teclaff, ‘‘Beyond Restoration – The Case of Ecocide’’, 34
Natural Resources Journal (1994) 933.
75 See Hayman, Gavin and Brack, Dunkan, Workshop Report: International
Environmental Crime: The Nature and Control of Environmental Black Markets
(the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London 1998).
76 See also, R. Cryer. et al above n.70, at 4–6.
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order to eliminate illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing,
calling on states to adopt sanctions which are ‘‘of sufficient sever-
ity.’’77 One commentator argued that this high number of interna-
tional treaties and other instruments providing for prohibitions and
punishment for environmental damage support the case for creation
of an international crime against the environment in times of peace.78
Of course, it is not that only crimes classified as ‘‘international’’
may be the subject of an international tribunal – any conduct
potentially might – this being more a policy question of which crimes
the relevant body setting up a court or tribunal want to establish.79
Similarly, Frederic Megret takes an expansive interpretation and
argues that internationally mandated domestic criminal law under
international agreements could legitimately be considered part of
international criminal law and that there is no clear criterion to
fundamentally distinguish them from the supranational criminal law
that is deemed partly worthy of prosecution by international criminal
tribunals.80 He goes on to argue that crimes in the first category may
one day move to the second, and crimes in the second are always
partly reliant on the mechanisms of the first. Following this more
expansive interpretation suggested by Megret, it is possible to regard
some forms of transnational criminal activities – including illegal
wildlife trade, transboundary illegal waste movements, and illegal
fishing – as forming part of the body of international criminal law.
This rationale adds support for the case for a broader crime of eco-
cide under international law which would have the potential to
encompass a wide range of prohibited transnational criminal activi-
ties.
77 See the voluntary 2001 FAO International Plan Of Action To Prevent, Deter And
Eliminate Illegal, Unreported And Unregulated Fishing: (21). See also, See also, the
2016 FAO Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing. See also Pereira, N. 38 above.
78 Matthew Gillet, note 25 above.
79 For example, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon had jurisdiction over, inter alia,
terrorism, or the Kosovo Specialist Chambers, with jurisdiction over, inter alia, other
crimes under domestic law.
80 See F. Megret, ‘‘International Criminal Law’’, in J. Beard and A. Mitchell
(eds.), International Law in Principle (2009). See also Frederic Megret, ‘‘The Case
for a General International Crime against the Environment’’, in Sebastien Jodoin
and Marie-Claire Condonier Segger (eds), Sustainable Development, International
Criminal Justice and Treaty Interpretation (CUP, 2013)
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2.3 The Legal Elements of a Crime of Ecocide: the Mens Rea
Requirement and the Scale and Severity of Environmental
Damage
From a practical as well as legal perspective one of the challenges
would be to establish the degree of mens rea required to establish a
crime of ecocide. Many instances of environmental offences are
committed without intention, including in the context of accidental
oil spills or nuclear accidents.81 A more restrictive definition of a
crime of ecocide might include a mens rea element of intention or
recklessness in destroying the planet.82 Yet if applied in those strict
terms, examples of acts of ecocide would be rare. Indeed, most cases
of environmental damage are not sufficient to destroy the planet as a
whole; rather it is the accumulation of different acts of environmental
damage and pollution that endangers the life in the planet.83 Al-
though under the Draft Ecocide Act (2011) applied in the UK Su-
preme Court mock trial in 2011 it was proposed that an international
crime of ecocide should include strict liability offences,84 most au-
thors conceptualising the crime of ecocide have argued that intention
or recklessness would be required, and that negligence and strict
liability would be insufficient.85 Moreover, as will be further discussed
below, ‘‘specific intent’’ is required for the commission of some of the
Rome Statute crimes such as genocide.86
Based on the codification attempts of the ILC discussed above, a
combination of existing human rights documents, emerging Con-
ventions in draft form, and various sources of soft-law, some publi-
cists have suggested that there is a strong case for the recognition of
an international crime of ecocide in cases involving serious environ-
81 Ibid.
82 For a discussion of the possible features of an international crime of ‘‘geocide’’,
see Lynn Berat, ‘‘Defending the Right to a Healthy Environment: Toward a Crime of
Geocide in International Law’’, Boston University International Law Journal (Fall,
1993). Indeed, it is not impossible to imagine acts of geocide, in particular if the
proliferation of nuclear weapons were to lead them to fall in the hands of rogue
states or groups.
83 Regina Rauxloh, ‘‘The Role of International Criminal Law in Environmental
Protection’’ in F. Botchway (ed.) Natural Resource Investment and Africa’s Devel-
opment (Edward Elgar, 2011), at 447.
84 This proposal appeared in the Draft Ecocide Act (2011), Art. 12. See further,
http://eradicatingecocide.com (accessed 15 March 2020). See also, Pereira, note. 38.
85 See e.g. McLaughlin above n. 45.
86 See section 3.2. below.
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mental damage.87 It is argued that the sheer harm caused by ecocide
justifies its application during peacetime activities that destroy or
damage ecosystems in a massive scale. In this vein, they have built the
case that these environmental crimes could rise to the status of jus
cogens – that is, a peremptory norm – similar to the prohibition on
slavery or the general prohibition on the use of force, making it
unlawful for states to derogate from that norm in future agree-
ments.88 It is then argued that causing severe environmental harm
could lead to the breach of an erga omnes duty of care arising from
international environmental law and human rights obligations and so
to the commission of an international delict.89 This argument mirrors
an earlier view by Theoron Meron that ‘‘there is a clear trend toward
the criminalisation of international law.’’90 He further argues that
this ‘‘trend is supported by simultaneous expansion of jurisdiction to
prosecute crimes arising from both international and non-interna-
tional conflicts, in both international and domestic tribunals, which
in turn has been spurred by recent developments in customary law.’’91
Although this statement concerned international criminal law in
general and was not specific to the environment, it provides an early
endorsement – or at least a recognition – of a trend towards crimi-
nalization in international law and institutions which has been con-
firmed following the creation of international courts and tribunals
and subsequent state practices and which could eventually be ex-
tended to protect a wider range of environmental values.
Therefore it appears crucial that it if the ICC jurisdiction were to
be extended to include ecocide, it would have to take into account the
scale and severity of the impact on the environment, for example the
number of victims or the degree of harm caused to the environment.
In this vein, under the 2016 OTP Policy paper the gravity of the
offence is a significant element driving the start of preliminary
investigations which ultimately limits prosecutorial discretion.92 This
87 See for example, M. Gray, above n. 35; Teclaf, above n. 74.
88 See ibid. and Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which
contains the following definition of the concept of peremptory norms: Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 115 UNTS 331
(entered into force 27 January 1980).
89 M. Gray, above n. 35, at 267.
90 Theodor Meron, ‘‘Is International Law Moving Towards Criminalization?’’
European Journal of International Law 9 (1998) 18–31.
91 Ibid.
92 See Office of the ICC OTP policy paper n.1, at 12.
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is in line with the enforcement of criminal sanctions for environ-
mental protection at the national level which is regarded in many
legal systems as the ultimum remedium.93 Yet depending on how it is
framed, the emphasis on the seriousness of the offence could pose a
significant limitation to the definition of ecocide. It could mean that
perhaps only the most serious incidents of environmental damage, for
example the state failure to prevent a nuclear accident,94 significant
oil spills95 or a major industrial accident (such as Bhopal disaster in
India),96 for example, could be recognised as acts of ecocide.97 The
conceptualisation of an international crime of ecocide based on the
seriousness and likelihood of harm would be consistent with existing
International Law Commission’s initiatives aimed at defining envi-
ronmental crimes as crimes under international law.
Regina Rauxloh – borrowing from the Additional Protocol I to
the Geneva Conventions – argued that the crime of ecocide should
prohibit acts ‘‘which are intended, or may be expected, to cause
widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environ-
ment.’’ 98Although this definition is helpful in linking a definition of
ecocide to a specific threshold of environmental damage, it is ques-
tionable whether the particularly high standards established under
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (applicable to ‘‘war
crimes’’) should be replicated to the context of ecocide committed in
the peacetime context or in post-conflict scenarios. For example,
because the most serious aspects of the damage caused by Saddam
Hussein’s lighting of the Kuwaiti oil wells lasted a shorter time than
expected, some commentators considered this to fall short of the
93 See further, Douglas Husak, ‘‘The Criminal Law as Last Resort’’, 24 Oxford
Journal of Legal Studies 2 (2004) 207–235.
94 Such as Chernobyl nuclear accident in 1986; or the Fukushima disaster in 2011.
See Linda Malone, The Chernobyl Accident: a Case Study in International Law
Regulating State Responsibility for Transboundary Nuclear Pollution. Columbia
Journal of Environmental Law 12 203 (1987).
95 This could include, for example, the Torrey Canyon oil spill off the coast of
Cornwall, Great Britain in 1967; the Amoco Cadiz spill off the coast of Brittany,
France in 1978; and the Exxon Valdez oil spill off the coast of Alaska, United States
in 1989.
96 See C. M Abraham and Sushila Abraham, The Bhopal Case and the Devel-
opment of Environmental Law in India. 40 International and Comparative Law
Quarterly 2(1991) pp. 334–365.
97 See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, above n. 43.
98 See Rauxloh, above note 83.
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long-term requirement of Additional Protocol I.99 But even though the
threshold under Article 8(2)(b)(iv) is particularly high,100 it should be
noted that if the crime is not being charged under that provision – and if
there is no other requirement – the general seriousness/gravity
requirement under Article 17(1)(d) would apply, which has been
interpreted as a relatively low threshold by the Court to date.101
Still, the relevance of the scale and severity of the impact of the
environmental harm was also implied when the International Law
Commission made reference to ‘‘massive pollution of the atmosphere
or the high seas’’ as possible international environmental crimes in
the original version of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility.102
This means that an eventual extension of the ICC jurisdiction should
include most issues of global environmental concerns and large-scale
harm such as the depletion of the ozone layer, global warming-related
damage (for example, the environmental damage caused by sea level
rises) and illegal acts leading to the exhaustion of natural resources or
extinction of species.103
It should be noted that the clause referring to the natural envi-
ronment under Article 8 (2)(b)(iv) of the ICC Statute is inspired by
articles 35 para. 3 and 55 Additional Protocol I.104 Their threshold is
higher than ENMOD, which provides for disjunctive criteria.105
Moreover, the reach of Article 8 (2)(b)(iv) is limited, because the
99 See, e.g., Y.Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International
Armed Conflict (2004). See further, Gillet, above note 25.
100 See associated commentary in Triffterer and Ambos (eds), The Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (Hart, Third ed., 2018)
101 See for example Al Werfalli case, Second Arrest Warrant (ICC-01/11-01/17-
13), para. 30, in which the Court stated that: ‘‘The Chamber recalls that in deter-
mining whether a case is of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court,
within the meaning of article 17(1)(d) of the Statute, it must have regard to: (i)
whether the case captures those persons who may bear the greatest responsibility for
the alleged crimes committed; and (ii) the gravity of the crimes allegedly committed,
which may be examined following both a quantitative and a qualitative approach.
With regard to the second element, the Chamber notes that cases encompassing a
limited number of casualties or even those dealing exclusively with the destruction of
buildings dedicated to religion have been considered to be sufficiently grave to justify
prosecution.’’
102 See Article 19 (3) (d)) in its Draft Articles on State Responsibility, above n. 43.
103 Ibid, at 449.
104 Triffterer and Ambos (eds), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court: A Commentary (Third ed., 2018), para. 253.
105 Ibid.
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provision only applies to international armed conflict and some
scholars find this limitation of Article 8 (2)(b)(iv) particularly trou-
bling.106 Similarly, Rules 43–45 of the ICRC’s study on customary law
restates the principle according to the which, prior to launching an
attack, precautionary measures shall be taken.107 However, like the
provisions of Additional Protocol I, neither the ICC Statute nor its
Elements specify themeaning of thewords ‘‘widespread, long-term and
excessive’’.108 A helpful definition of this threshold is found in the
UNEP study which suggested that the notions of ‘‘widespread’’ should
be read as encompassing an area on the scale of several hundred square
kilometers, ‘‘long-term’’ as a period of months or approximately a
season, and ‘‘serious’’ as involving serious or significant disruption to
human life, natural and economic resources and other sources.109
In light of those considerations, my view is that a crime of ecocide
under the ICC Stature should be linked to a threshold of environmental
damage based on the scale and severity of harm, but it should not be
restricted to ‘‘widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural
environment’’ as set out under Additional Protocol I of the Geneva
Conventions or Article 8 (2)(b)(iv) of the ICC Statute. Other commen-
tators have similarly proposed an international crime of ecocide that is
linked to a threshold of serious environmental damage, but using a
broader terminology than the Additional Protocol I. For example Poly
Higgins envisioned a case in which the Court’s jurisdiction is limited to
conduct that amounts to ‘‘extensive destruction, damage to or loss of
ecosystem(s) of agiven territory’’.110Similarly,MarkGrayargued that, to
be described legally as ecocide, ecological damage must be ‘‘serious, and
extensive or lasting’’, and result in ‘‘international consequences.’’111
106 See, for example M. Wattad, ‘‘The Rome Statute & Captain Planet: What Lies
Between Crimes against Humanity’ and the Natural Environment’?’’, (2009) 19
Fordham Environmental Law Review 265, 268; Drumbl, supra note 11, at 136. See
also, Gillet, note 25. See also Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Decision on the Defence
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Case No.IT-94–1-A, App.Ch., 2
October 1995 (‘‘Tadic Jurisdiction Decision’’), para. 97.
107 para. 253.
108 Ibid.
109 UNEP, 5 para 1 of recommendations. See further, Lawrence, J. C. and Heller,
k.j., ‘‘The limits of article 8 (2) (b) (iv) of the Rome Statute, the first ecocentric
environmental war crime,’’ 20 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review
61 (2007).
110 Higgins, above note 2.
111 Mark Allan Gray, ‘‘The International Crime of Ecocide’’ (1995) 26 California
Western International Law Journal 215, 216.
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If the rationale for criminalisation at the international level based
on the seriousness of the harm or threat of harm to the environment
is correct, then some of the most serious incidents of environmental
damage could amount to acts of ‘‘ecocide’’, as mentioned above, this
could include the state failure to prevent a nuclear accident, signifi-
cant oil spills or a major industrial accident (such as Bhopal disaster
in India). This would be particularly the case if environmental
damage were to leave an ecosystem beyond repair, for example if a
single nuclear disaster had the potential to leave the earth or par-
ticular ecosystems unfit to sustain human or animal and plant life.
Moreover, when indigenous peoples are subject to serious human
rights violations, including dispossession and grabbing of their lands
and natural resources and the causing of environmental damage in
their lands, it is very likely that the high threshold for establishment
of an international crime of ecocide (or ‘‘ethnocide’’) would be met.112
Yet as will be discussed in section 2.4. below, not every human right
violation constitute an international crime and so it is not necessarily
the case that human rights abuses committed against indigenous
peoples equate to international crimes.113 However, in light of the
growing number of international and regional human rights instru-
ments protecting indigenous peoples’’ rights,114 crimes committed
against indigenous peoples should be regarded as particularly serious
– and they embody the ‘‘enthropocentric’’ element enabling the OTP
to bring charges for the international crimes currently recognised in
the ICC Statute, including crimes against humanity and genocide.
112 As regards decisions of the international and regional courts and tribunals
addressing violations of indigenous peoples’ human rights in the context of extractive
industry projects, see for example Saramaka People v Suriname [2007] Inter-Am
Court HR (ser C) No 172; Sawhoyamaxa [2006] Inter-Am Court HR (ser C) No 146,
73; Moiwana Community v Suriname [2005] Inter-Am Court HR (ser C) No 124.
Awas Tingni [2001] Inter-Am Court HR (ser C) No 79, 5 [25]; Kichwa Indigenous
People of Sarayaku v Ecuador [2012] Inter-Am Court HR (ser C) No 245.
113 See further, T. Anthony, Indigenous People, Crime and Punishment, (Rout-
ledge, 2013).
114 See for example UNDRIP, GA Res 61/295, UN GAOR, 61st sess, 107th plen
mtg, Agenda Item 68, Supp No 49, UN Doc A/RES/61/295 (2 October 2007) annex
(United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’) and Convention
(No 169) concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, opened
for signature 27 June 1989, 1650 UNTS 383 (entered into force 5 September 1991).
See further, Pereira, R. and Gough, O., ‘‘Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Re-
sources in the 21st Century: Natural Resource Governance and the Right of Self-
Determination of Indigenous Peoples under International Law’’’ 14 (2) Melbourne
Journal of International Law (2013), 451.
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A wide range of examples of current practices in several States that
have led to serious environmental damage and illegal exploitation of
natural resources, some of which could be conceptualized either
individually or collectively as ‘‘ecocide’’, is found in the most recent
United Nations Environment Programme’s study on the ‘‘The State
of Knowledge of Crimes that have Serious Impacts on the Environ-
ment’’ published in June 2018,115especially if one follows an expan-
sive definition of international crimes suggested by Frederic Megret
as was discussed above. For example, the UNEP study reports that
wildlife crime is a particularly persistent problem in Africa, Asia and
Latin America, where all kinds of species – mammals, birdlife, rep-
tiles and amphibians, insects, and plants – are affected.116 Asia,
North America, and the European Union are common destinations
for wildlife trafficking, alongside the Gulf countries for illegal char-
coal and illegal gold from African countries.117 Moreover, countries
in Asia are increasingly becoming major consumer markets of a wide
range of illegal wildlife resources and products including rare highly
valuable wood like rosewood.118 Another example of serious and
illegal harms to the environment committed during peacetime include
the 600 tons of caustic soda and petroleum residues were dumped in
open-air public waste sites in Abidjan, Ivory Coast, in August
2006.119
In line with those developments, the ICC OTP 2016 Policy paper
guides the prosecutor to assess the gravity of the crime as a key case
selection criterion in ‘‘a given situation’’ which should reflect a
115 UNEP, The State of Knowledge of Crimes that have Serious Impacts on the
Environment published in June 2018, https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.
500.11822/25713/knowledge_crime_envImpacts.pdf?isAllowed=y&sequence=1 (ac





117 Nellemann, C., Henriksen, R., Raxter, P., Ash, N., Mrema, E. (Eds). 2014. The
Environmental Crime Crisis: Threats to Sustainable Development from Illegal
Exploitation and Trade in Wildlife and Forest Resources. A Rapid Response Assess-
ment. A UNEP Rapid Response Assessment. United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme and GRID-Arendal, Nairobi and Arendal, at 4. available at http://www.
unep.org/unea/docs/rracrimecrisis.pdf (accessed on 15 March 2020).
118 The Royal Institute of International Affairs: Controlling the international
trade in illegally logged timber and wood products, London 2002, at 9.
119 See also Gillet, above note 25.
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‘‘concern to the international community as a whole.’’120 In partic-
ular, the factors that will guide the ICC prosecutor include the ‘‘scale,
nature, manner of commission, and impact of crimes.’’121 The man-
ner of commission of a crime is to be assessed inter alia (…) on
whether it results in ‘‘the destruction of the environment or protected
objects.’’122 Moreover, when assessing the impact of crime the ICC
prosecutor will give particular consideration to prosecuting Rome
Statute crimes committed by means of, or that result in, inter alia the
destruction of the environment. Therefore, the assessment of gravity
will most certainly limit the exercise of prosecutorial discretion by the
ICC prosecutor and inform her to act guided by the substantive and
procedural provisions under the Rome Statute.123,124 This suggests
that the ICC prosecutor’s discretion is not absolute and is limited by
the Rome Statute and the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
Indeed, it is in the assessment of the gravity of the offence that the
ICC Prosecutor’s Policy Paper will prove to be particularly influen-
tial, given the emphasis that it places on crimes committed by means
of, or resulting in, the ‘‘destruction of the environment’’ and leading
to ‘‘environmental damage inflicted on affected communities’’ as
particularly serious crimes.125
Yet the identification of individual offenders would not always be
straightforward. This is particularly so in the case of illegal economic
activities causing serious pollution which come from many sources as
the identification of individual offenders often proves to be difficult, if
120 ICC OTP Policy paper, above n. 1, para. 35.
121 ICC OTP paper, above n.1, paras 32 and 37.
122 ICC OTP paper, above n.1 para. 41.
123 See also, Alessandra Mistura, ‘‘Is There Space for Environmental Crime under
International Criminal Law? The Impact of the Office of the Prosecutor Policy Paper
on Case Selection and Prioritization on the Current Legal Framework’’, 14 Columbia
Journal of Environmental Law 1 (2018) at 216.
124 See Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor, ICC-BD/05-01-09, reg. 1.1
(Apr. 23, 2009), 29.2. The gravity of the offence as an element for the court to decide
to the admissibility of a case pursuant to Article 17.1 (d) of the Rome Statute, and
prosecutor in determining whether to start an investigation under Article 15.3 or Art.
53 of the Rome Statute. For example, Regulation 29 of the OTP Regulations pro-
vides generally that, in assessing the gravity for the purposes of initiating an inves-
tigation, the Prosecutor shall consider inter alia the scale, the nature, the manner of
commission, and the impact of potential crimes.
125 Office of Prosecutor Policy Paper, above n.1, paras 13–14.
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not impossible.126 In fact, the difficulties in identifying and assigning
liability to specific individual offenders would be a particularly strong
argument for a wider range of mechanisms establishing State
responsibility for environmental damage in the civil sphere to com-
plement the mechanisms under international criminal law for
assigning individual criminal liability.127
2.4 A Human Rights-Centred Crime of Ecocide?
When serious environmental damage, illegal natural resources
exploitation and land grabbing amount to human rights violations,
arguably the case for criminalisation at the international level be-
comes even more apparent and imperative.128 The importance of
environmental protection to international human rights is now
recognised in international environmental and human rights con-
ventions and decisions of international and national courts and tri-
bunals.129 It could be argued that since the ICC has jurisdiction over
the most serious crimes of concern to the international community,
when defining the limits of those crimes the ICC should also prose-
cute environmental offences amounting to human rights abuses. Yet
it is often not clear the exact point at which environmental damage
crosses the threshold of a human rights violation,130 and it is certainly
126 Mclaughlin, above n. 45, at 397–398. There is also the option of being more
strategic in litigation and bringing some key cases that will develop the case law and
allow for gradual emergence of new standards and other cases under its shadow. See
for example Al Mahdi or Werfalli cases before the ICC.
127 Rauxloh above n. 83. See also, ibid.
128 See further Francesca Romanin Jacur, Angelica Bonfanti and Francesco
Seatzu (eds), Natural Resource Grabbing: An International Law Perspective (Brill,
2015).
129 See for example Article 11 of the 1988 Additional Protocol to the American
Convention of Human Rights (‘‘Protocol of San Salvador’’ (adopted on November
17, 1988 not yet in force); Article 24 of the African Charter on Human and People’s
Rights; and Article 37 of the Charter on Fundamental Rights of the European Union
(2010/C 83/02). See generally Alan Boyle and Michael Anderson (eds). Human
Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1996).
For an overview of the case law, see infra.
130 The case law of the European Court of Human Rights include Hatton and
Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 36022/97, § 96, ECHR 2003–VIII); Lo´pez
Ostra v. Spain (judgment of 9 December 1994, Series A no. 303-C; Guerra and Others
v. Italy (judgment of 19 February 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998–I);
Fadeyeva v. Russia (no. 55723/00, ECHR 2005–IV); Moreno Go´mez v. Spain
(no. 4143/02, ECHR 2004–X) In Sporrong and Lonnroth v Sweden (1982) 51 Eur Ct
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not the case that every human rights violation is an international
crime.131 However, in the past few decades there has been a growing
international recognition of the potential for use of human rights
norms for achieving environmental protection.132,133 For example the
UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights regarded
the contamination of the areas inhabited by people by various toxic
wastes as a violation of fundamental social and economic rights.134
And although the 1998 Council of Europe Convention on the Pro-
tection of the Environment through criminal law135 is not in force, in
Oneryildiz v Turkey136 the European Court of Human Rights noted
the text of the Convention when assessing the basis for authorities to
establish criminal offences for loss of life involving the disposal or
treatment of hazardous waste.137
In what Francoise Tulkens has termed the ‘‘offensive role of hu-
man rights’’, (international) criminal law plays an important role in
protecting human rights as has been recognized by international and
Footnote 130 continued
H R para 61 the ECtHR; Fagerskiold v Sweden (Application No 37664/04, decision
of 26 February 2008).
131 On the relationship between international criminal law and international hu-
man rights law, see for example G. Sluiter, ‘‘International Criminal Proceedings and
the Protection of Human Rights’’, 37 New Eng. L. Rev (2002).
132 See P. Sharp, ‘‘Prospects for Environmental Liability in the International
Criminal Court’’ 217 Virginia Law Journal (1999), at 219.
133 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature
19 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) (‘‘ICCPR’’);
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature
16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976) (‘‘ICESCR’’).
134 See Economic, Social And Cultural Rights, Adverse effects of the illicit
movement and dumping of toxic and dangerous products and wastes on the
enjoyment of human rights. Report submitted by the Special Rapporteur on toxic
waste, Mrs. Fatma-Zohra Ouhachi-Vesely GE.01, , Fifty-seventh session, E/CN.4/
2001/55 19 January 2001, https://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/environment/waste/
(accessed 22 September 2019).
135 1998 Strasbourg Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of the
Environment through criminal law (ETS no. 172), not yet in force.
136 Oneryildiz v Turkey, App. No. 48939/99 [2004] Eur.Ct. H.R 657 (30 November
2004).
137 See also Diana Shelton, ‘‘Legitimate and Necessary: Adjudicating Human
Rights Violations related to Activities Causing Environmental Harm or Risk’’,
JHRE (2015) pp. 139–155.
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regional human rights courts.138 For example in the M.C. v. Bulgaria
judgment of 4 December 2003, the European Court of Human Rights
held that ‘‘effective protection against rape and sexual abuse requires
measures of a criminal-law nature’’.139 William Schabas has also
observed the growing cross-fertilization between human rights and
the international criminal justice system.140 For example prosecutions
for incitement to genocide and hate speech as a crime against
humanity at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda raised
difficult issues concerning the scope of freedom of expression. In the
Trial Chamber decision, there was much reliance upon the case law of
the European Court of Human Rights, as the judges sought to justify
a rather high level of intrusion in the freedom of the media.141
In one example of serious human right violations involving envi-
ronmental damage and illegal natural resources exploitation in a re-
gional context, the Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the
Center for Economic and Social Rights v Nigeria case before theAfrican
Commission on Human Rights142 concerned the negative health and
environmental impacts of oil exploration in Ogoniland due to the
contamination of water on indigenous land with lead and mercury
affecting community health, particularly that of the children. Nigeria
was found to have violated several articles of the African Charter and
theAfricanCommission called on the government to ensure protection
of the environment, health and livelihood of the Ogoni people.143
138 Francoise Tulkens, The Paradoxical Relationship between Criminal Law and
Human Rights, Journal of International Criminal Justice 9 (2011), 577. On the
relationship between international criminal law and international human rights law,
see also example G. Sluiter, ‘‘International Criminal Proceedings and the Protection
of Human Rights’’, 37 New Eng. L. Rev (2002).
139 M.C. v. Bulgaria, Appl. No. 39272/98, 4 December 2003, x186, ECHR 2003-
XII (extracts).
140 William Schabas, Synergy or Fragmentation? International Criminal Law and
the European Convention on Human Rights, Journal of International Criminal
Justice 9 (2011), 609.
141 Judgment and Sentence, Nahimana et al. (ICTR-99-52-T), Trial Chamber, 3
December 2003, x1001. See also: Judgment, Bikindi (ICTR-01-72-T), Trial Chamber,
2 December 2008, x 380, fn.857. See further, ibid.
142 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Communication No 155/
96: The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and
Social Rights v Nigeria, 30th sess (27 October 2001) [56] (‘‘Ogoni’’).
143 Ibid [68]–[69]. See further, Fons Coomans, The Ogoni Case before the African
Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, 53(3) International and Comparative
Law Quarterly (2003).
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Moreover, the Commission called for the compensation to victims of
human rights violations – including relief and resettlement assistance to
victims of government raids – and undertaking Comprehensive Clean-
Up Of Lands And Rivers Damaged By Oil Operators.144
It is submitted that it is fundamental that environmental protec-
tion and human rights protection continue to evolve in close con-
nection which would further advance the case for creation of an
international crime of ecocide. The cross-fertilisation between the two
fields, as recognized by the decisions of international courts and tri-
bunals discussed above, further supports the case for a human-rights
centred crime of ecocide. However, this could simultaneously raise
questions about what the added value of the ICC jurisdiction would
be in this context, given that there are existing human rights courts,
tribunals and treaty bodies which can enforce environmental norms
amounting to human rights violations. Yet the jurisdiction of inter-
national and regional human rights courts and tribunals is often
limited to a certain region or in scope – providing remedies against
the State rather than establishing individual (criminal) responsibility
– and they are not strictly concerned with realizing international
criminal justice for serious environmental damage or illegal natural
resources exploitation.145 As was observed by Emmanuel Dexaux,
there is a significant difference between a justice system affording civil
redress for damage suffered by victims by holding states responsible
in the manner of the European Court of Human Rights does; and a
justice system based on criminal responsibility of the perpetrators of
international crimes, with the victims having no other place in the
proceedings than as witnesses.146 Hence human rights courts and
tribunals could not provide an effective replacement for the ICC
jurisdiction as a forum for prosecutions against individual offenders
for ecocide.
144 Ibid [68]–[69].
145 In this context, it should be reminded of the ongoing debate over whether a
specialist International Environmental Court should be set up. See further Ellen Hey,
Reflections on an International Environmental Court, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,
2000); and Sean Murphy, Does the World Need a New International Environmental
Court? 32 Geo. Wash. J. Int’l L. & Econ. 333 (1999–2000). On the question of
enforcing environmental rights generally see the classic work by Christopher Stone,
Should Trees have Standing? Law, Morality and the Environment (OUP, 2010).
146 Emmanuel Decaux, The Place of Human Rights Courts and International
Criminal Courts in the International System, Journal of International Criminal Jus-
tice 9 (2011), 597.
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III THE LIMITS OF THE ICC EXISTING JURISDICTION
OVER SERIOUS ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE, ILLE-
GAL NATURAL RESOURCE EXPLOITATION
AND LAND GRABBING
This section starts with a brief overview of the environmental war
crime under the ICC Statute, as it has been the subject of consider-
able academic attention and commentaries.147 It then focuses on the
less explored question of how far two of the existing crimes under the
ICC (crimes against humanity and genocide) could be used to pros-
ecute environmental damage, illegal natural resources exploitation
and land grabbing. The section finally evaluates the likelihood that
the 2016 Office of the Prosecutor will impact on the prosecutions of
those existing ICC Statute crimes, taking also into account the
question of corporate criminal liability.
3.1 The ‘‘Environmental’’ War Crime Under the ICC Statute
The war crime under Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the ICC Statute adopts an
eco-centric formulation that requires an international attack to be
committed with the knowledge that it would cause ‘‘widespread,
long-term and severe damage to the environment which would be
clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military
advantage anticipated.’’148 This provision thus mirrors Article 20 (g)
of the ILC Code of Offences against Peace and Security.149 Although
the ICC statute does not define ‘‘damage to the environment,’’ some
guidance could be found in other international agreements150 even
though one of the shortfalls of many international environmental
agreements is that they generally fail to define environmental dam-
147 See further Marie G. Jacobsson, Special Rapporteur, Third report on the
Protection of the Environment in relation to Armed Conflicts, International Law
Commission, Sixty-eighth session (2016).
148 Rome Statute, supra, Article 8 (2)(b)(iv). (emphasis added)
149 Art. 20 (g) ILC Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of
Mankind, above n. 28.
150 See Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Ob-
ject, March 29, 1972, 961 UNTS 187, Article I (1).
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age.151 It is in the context of war crimes that the ICC OTP 2016 policy
paper is expected to be particularly influential in driving the court to
adjudicate over crimes committed through environmental means and
illegal resources exploitation. It is possible that the court will come to
clarify not only the scope of the ‘‘environmental’’ war crime under
Article 8 (2)(b)(iv), but also whether the illegal exploitation of natural
resources in conflict situations (such as illegal logging or the
destruction and trafficking of endangered species) could amount to
‘‘pillage’’ and therefore to a war crime under Article 8 (2) (b) (xvi).152
The clarification by the court on this question would be particularly
significant in light of a string of Security Council Resolutions rec-
ognizing the interconnections between the exploitation of natural
resources and armed conflicts, including in the contexts of the con-
flicts in Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo.153 Yet
one study suggested that, even in the limited context of war crimes,
the current international rules on armed conflict may be ineffective in
the context of environmental crime.154 In any event, the impact of the
ICC OTP 2016 policy paper is likely to be limited even in the context
of war crimes as it is only ‘‘an internal document of the Office and, as
such, it does not give rise to legal rights.’’155 In the more recent ICC
Trial Chamber VI case Bosco Ntaganda was found guilty of 18
counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the
Democratic Republic of Congo in 2002–2003.156 In the proceedings it
was alleged that the UPC (Union Patriotic Congolose) entered into
agreements with private companies providing for exploitation of
natural resources in the territory under its control, in exchange for
151 See e.g. the 1988 Convention on Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resources
Activities (CRAMRA) (not in force), Article 1(15)).
152 For an in depth analysis of whether the war crime of pillage could address the
illegal exploitation of natural resources in armed conflicts, see Larissa van den Herik
and Daniella Dam-De Jong, ‘‘Revitalizing the Antique War Crime of Pillage: The
Potential and Pitfalls of Using International Criminal Law to Address Illegal Re-
source Exploitation During Armed Conflicts’’ 22 Criminal Law Forum 3, Springer
Netherlands (2011).
153 See Resolution 1306 (2003) concerning the illicit trade in diamonds during the
conflict in Sierra Leone; and Resolutions 1457 (2003), 1856 (2008) and 1952 (2010)
concerning the DRC. See further, ibid.
154 See K. Hulme, above n. 10.
155 ICC OTP policy paper above n.1, para 2.
156 See The Prosecutor v. Bosco NtagandaSituation: Situation in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Trial Chamber VI, 08 July 2019
RICARDO PEREIRA
payment.157 However, illegal exploitation of natural resources played
a minor role in Bosco Ntaganda’s conviction for crimes against
humanity, and the charges for the war crime of pillage related to a
number of appliances, but not natural resources, and those charges
were dismissed by the court. In fact, Ntaganda was not charged with
pillage of natural resources but the Trial Chamber does make positive
findings that the UPC entered into agreements with private compa-
nies for the exploitation of natural resources.158
Moreover, even though in the Bemba case the Trial Chamber III
found the MLC soldiers committed the war crime of pillaging
throughout the 2002–2003 CAR Operations and throughout the
areas in which they were present,159 the Appeals Chamber found
errors in the judgment and reversed all charges against the defendant
for war crimes and crimes against humanity.160 And as with the
Ntaganda case, Bemba was not charged for pillaging natural re-
sources but for pillaging a number of goods and appliances such as
household items (such as furniture), business supplies, tools, money,
vehicles and/or livestock.161 This has led Jeremie Gilbert to note that
there is a lack of a developed jurisprudence examining the connec-
tions between international crimes and natural resources and cur-
rently no systematic jurisprudence regarding pillage of natural
resources.162
157 Ibid, para. 440.
158 See (ICC-01/04-02/06-2359), para 440. Mongbwalu, the second most important
town in Ituri after Bunia as known to be a strategic location and a gold mining town,
where the Kilo-Moto gold mining company was located. Two UPC/FPLC attempts
to control Mongbwalu and the surrounding areas (…), the first failed attempt and
the First Operation. During its control over Mongbwalu, the UPC/FPLC showed
interest in the factory of the Kilo-Moto gold mining company and also showed its
intention to raise funds in relation to the exploitation of the gold mines.
159 Trial Chamber III Situation in the Central African Republic in the Case of the
Prosecutor V. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 21 March 2016, ICC-01/05-01/08-3343.
160 Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Central African Republic in the Case of the
Prosecutor V. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 8 June 2018, ICC-01/05-01/08.
161 Trial Chamber III Situation in the Central African Republic in the Case of the
Prosecutor V. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 21 March 2016, ICC-01/05-01/08-3343,
para. 643.
162 See J. Gilbert, Natural Resources and Human Rights: An Appraisal (OUP, 2018)
at 106. There is instead an ‘‘episodic’’ approach to this question by the ICJ. See e.g.
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Congo v Uganda) (Judgment) [2005]
ICJ Rep 168. See further. P. Keenan ‘‘Conflict Minerals and the Law of Pillage’’ 14
(2) Chicago Journal of International Law (2014) 524–558.
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It should be noted though that International Law Commission
since its sixty-fifth session in 2013 has decided to work on the topic of
the ‘‘protection of the environment in relation to armed conflicts’’
and an outcome document endorsed by the UN General Assembly
may come to clarify the circumstances in which illegal natural re-
sources exploitation may amount to a war crime.163 In her second
report, the Special Rapporteur addressed certain questions related to
the protection of the environment in non-international armed con-
flicts, with a focus on how the international rules and practices
concerning natural resources may enhance the protection of the
environment during and after such conflicts.164 The second report
also addressed certain questions related to the responsibility and
liability of States and non-State actors and has proposed seven draft
principles for the protection of the environment in armed conflicts.165
Yet because Article 8 (2)(b)(iv) and Article 8 (2) (b) (xvi) only apply
in cases where environmental damage occurs in the course of an
international conflict, they effectively preclude cases where environ-
mental damage occurs during peacetime or in the course of a non-
international conflict.166 Those limitations restrict the punitive and
deterrence impacts of of criminal liability and hence fail to provide the
basis for a broader recognition of an international crime of ecocide.
3.2 Beyond War Crimes: The Basis for and Limits of the ICC Juris-
diction Over Crimes Against Humanity and Genocide
Beyond the context of war crimes, a less explored issue among
scholars and policy makers is the scope for environmental damage,
illegal natural resources exploitation and land grabbing to be prose-
cuted under the existing crimes listed in Article 5 of the Rome Statute if
it they meet the typologies of the crimes of genocide and crimes against
humanity. Indeed, in case there is no consensus among the parties to
extend the ICC over ecocide, the only other possible avenues for
prosecution of environmental damage before the ICC would be in the
context of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.
163 See further, Marie G. Jacobsson, above note 146.
164 Ibid, Para. 64.
165 See second report of the Special Rapporteur (A/CN.4/728): draft principle 6 bis
(Corporate due diligence), draft principle 8 bis (Martens Clause), draft principle 13
bis (Environmental modification techniques), draft principle 13 ter (Pillage), draft
principle 13 quater (Responsibility and liability), draft principle 13 quinquies (Cor-
porate responsibility), and draft principle 14 bis (Human displacement).
166 See also, Mwanza, above note 20.
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The challenges in classifying environmental crime as falling under
the umbrella of one of the existing crimes covered by the ICC statute is
evident in the case of crimes against humanity.167 Like genocide, crimes
against humanity do not need to occur in the context of an armed
conflict. The Rome Statute defines crimes against humanity as acts
committed as part of a ‘‘widespread or systematic attack directed
against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack’’168 and
includes murder, extermination, ‘‘or other inhumane acts of similar
character intentionally causing great suffering or serious injury to body
or to mental or physical health,’’169 which could include for example
water contamination caused to kill a civilian population. But to what
extent could environmental damage amount to a crime against
humanity under theRome Statute? Firstly, as perArticle 7 (1) (k) of the
Rome Statute, the attack to the environment would need to endanger
human health in order to be recognized as a crime against humanity,
thus it would leave the environment as such without effective legal
protection. Moreover, the Rome Statute requires that the attack must
be ‘‘widespread or systematic’’. This certainly limits the scope of this
provision as many instances of environmental damage would not meet
this threshold. As regards the requirement that the act is directed at a
civilian population, when the continuous and foreseeable result of the
extraction produces severe environmental damage which kills local
populations, a policy to continue such extraction becomes tantamount
to an official policy to carry out attacks against a civilian population.170
According to Article 7 (2) (a) of the Rome State, this act must be
pursuant to ‘‘a State or organizational policy’’ to commit such attack.
The policy does not need to emanate from the State – non-State actors
or private individuals who exercise de facto power can constitute the
entity behind an organizational policy.171
167 See generally, Iris Haenen, ‘‘Classifying Acts as Crimes Against Humanity in
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’’, 14 German Law Journal 7
(2013).
168 See Rome Statute, Article 7 (1).
169 Ibid, Article 7 (1) (k).
170 See P. Sharp, above note 131 at. 239. and Pereira, above note 38. For a detailed
analysis of the ‘‘widespread or systematic’’ requirement, see Triffterer / Ambos (eds.)
above N.100. pp. 167–172
171 Triffterer / Ambos (eds.) above note 100 p. 246. The ICC’s position is that the
concept of ‘‘organisation’’ is predicted on the respective group’s ‘‘capability to
perform acts which infringe on basic human values’’ and not ‘‘the formal nature of a
group and the level of organisation’’ See e.g. Situation in the Republic of Kenya, No.
ICC-01/09-19, Decision on the Authorisation of Investigation, Pre-Trial Chamber.
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It is not impossible to think of examples of environmental damage
which are ‘‘widespread or systematic’’ and as part of an ‘‘official
policy to carry out attacks against a civilian population.’’ Those
conditions may have been fulfilled when a pipeline operated by
Texaco Petroleum Company / Chevron in Ecuador continuously
discharged millions of gallons of toxic waste and oil over a period of
twenty years, causing damage to the environment and indigenous
people.172 Texaco / Chevron started its oil extraction operations in
Ecuador since 1964 and, following the serious environmental and
human health damage caused by its operations in the 1980s, it can-
celled all operations in Ecuador in 1993. Damage resulting from oil
exploitations by the company posed a threat to the livelihood of the
people and the viability and health of the environment. The indige-
nous groups that inhabited the Ecuadorian Amazon region have been
deeply affected.173 A Communication representing several victims
(the Lago Agrio Victims’ request’’) was brought before the ICC
prosecutor in October 2014174 arguing that those violations amoun-
ted to crimes against humanity under Article 7 of the Rome Statute,
but that communication was dismissed by the ICC prosecutor in
April 2015 based on evidentiary grounds. Moreover, the ICC pros-
ecutor dismissed the petition on the basis of the lex temporalis
principle since the events in question happened before the entry into
force of the ICC statute and Ecuador’s ratification of the ICC Statute
in 2002.175
A similar fate is looking set to happen to a Communication
brought by Global Diligence LLP on behalf of the victims (‘‘Filing
Victims’’) before the OTP in October 2014. The Communication al-
leged that widespread and systematic large-scale land grabbing con-
ducted by the Cambodian ruling elite since the year 2000 by way of
illegally seizing and re-allocating millions of hectares of valuable land
(and leading to the displacement of over 60,000 victims) for
exploitation or speculation by its members and foreign investors
amounted to crimes against humanity as defined under Article 7 of
172 See US 2nd Cir.Aguinda v. Texaco Inc. 2000 10650.
173 See Audrey Crasson, ‘‘The Case of Chevron in Ecuador: the need for an
international crime against the environment?’’ 9 Amsterdam Law Forum 3 30.
174 See Communication (Oct 2014)– Situation in Ecuador (representing victims).
175 For detailed analysis of this communication to the ICC and whether Chevron
has committed crimes against humanity in Ecuador, see Caitlin Lambert, ‘‘Envi-
ronmental Destruction in Ecuador: Crimes against Humanity under the Rome
Statute?’’ 30 Leiden Journal of International Law (2017).
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the ICC Statute.176 The Communication, which is widely regarded to
have inspired the adoption of the 2016 OTP Policy Paper on case
selection and prosecution, alleges that the land grabbings amounted
to a ‘‘deportation or forcible transfer of the population’’ which is
defined in the Rome Statute as the ‘‘forced displacement of the per-
sons concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts from the area that
they are lawfully present, without grounds permitted under interna-
tional law.’’177 It should be noted that the problem of land disputes in
Cambodia had been highlighted previously by the UN Special Rap-
porteur on Cambodia.178 However, to date no preliminary exami-
nations have been initiated by the ICC prosecutor and little
information is available on the case in light of a request of the ICC
that the Communication is dealt with privacy. If the facts described in
the Global Diligence Communication are accurate, it appears likely
that the forced evictions in Cambodia would meet the elements of the
chapeau of Article 7 in particular the ‘‘widespread or systematic at-
tack’’ and potentially also the requirement that the attack is ‘‘directed
against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.’’179
However, since the Cambodian government’s economic policy was
driven by the interests of foreign investors, one commentator sug-
gested that the forced evictions may not amount to a ‘‘State or
organizational policy’’ as required under Article 7 (1) of the ICC
Statute,180 and this may help to explain the reluctance of the OTP to
176 FIDH/Global Diligence, Executive Summary: Communication under Article
15 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: the Commission of
Crimes against Humanity in Cambodia July 2002 to Presenthttps://www.fidh.org/
IMG/pdf/executive_summary-2.pdf (accessed 15 March 2020). For a detailed anal
ysis of the Communication, see Franziska Maria Oehm, Land Grabbing in Cam
bodia as a Crime Against Humanity – Approaches in International Criminal Law,
Verfassung und Recht in Ubersee, Law and Politics in Africa / Asia / Latin America,
48 (2015), 469–491.
177 See Article 7 (1) (d) and Article 7 (2) (d) of the Rome Statute.
178 See UN Human Rights Council, A/HRC/27/70, Report of the Special Rap-
porteur Surya P. Subedi on the situation of human rights in Cambodia 2014, p. 13,
para. 48.
179 See further in detail, F. Oehm (supra)
180 Ibid. This may be contrasted with the forced evictions and deportations of the
Rohingyas minority in Myanmar. See further, Beth Schaack, ‘‘Determining the
Commission of Genocide in Myanmar: Legal and Policy Considerations’’ 17 Journal
of International Criminal Justice 2 (2019). See also from a broader public interna-
tional law perspective and in particular the uti possidetis principle, M. Shahabuddin,
‘‘Post Colonial Boundaries, International Law, and the Making of the Rohingya
Crisis in Myanmar’’ Asian Journal of International Law 9, (2019) pp. 334–358.
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initiate preliminary examinations more than 5 years since the Com-
munication was filed. Yet in this regard the Communication draws
attention to the statement of the Extraordinary Chambers in the
Court of Cambodia (ECCC) that ‘‘[e]conomic policy is not one of the
grounds recognised under international law that justifies forced
transfer of a population’’181 and it is not evidence from a reading of
Article 7 (2) (d) that a state policy of forced evictions may be justi-
fiable on economic grounds
Despite the failure of those two communications to trigger the
OTP to iniate preliminary examinations to date as was hoped fol-
lowing the publication of the 2016 OTP Policy Paper, it should be
emphasized that the very existence of OTP Communications is dif-
ficult to monitor. As Fairlie highlighted, the practice of the Office has
been ‘‘to keep both the requests and subsequent analyses private’’.182
Therefore only Communications that the authors themselves have
publicised are generally available to the public.183 Even though the
2016 Policy Paper had the potential to encourage more non-gov-
ernmental organizations to bring communications before the OTP for
the conduct described in the paper, it is difficult to ascertain the
success rate of existing Communications as they are only occasionally
made available to the general public.
An even higher threshold would be required to link environmental
damage with acts of genocide, in violation of the UN 1948 Genocide
Convention184 and Article 6 of the Rome Statute, thus potentially
attracting the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.185 The
implications of this would be significant. This is so not only because
the term ‘‘ecocide’’ was coined by analogy to the crime of ‘‘genocide’’,
but also because the crime of genocide carries the highest degree of
social and political disapproval among the existing international
181 ECCC, Trial Chamber, Case 002/01 Judgment, (002-19-09-2007-TC), 7 August
2014, para. 549. It should be noted that Cambodia, alongside the Phillipines, are the
only two South East Asian country to have ratified the ICC Statute See further, H.
Takemura, the Asian Region and the International Criminal Court, Contemporary
Issues in Human Rights Law (2018)
182 M.A. Fairlie, ‘‘The Hidden Costs of Strategic Communications for the Inter-
national Criminal Court’’, 51 Texas International Law Journal (2016) 281^319, at
283. See also, Bernaz note 19.
183 Ibid.
184 UN Convention on the Prevention and Prohibition of the Crime of Genocide,
adopted by Resolution 260 (III) A of the U.N. General Assembly on 9 December
1948, Article 2.
185 Article 6 of the Rome Statute (1998).
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crimes. 186 Yet there would be several legal challenges for environ-
mental damage, illegal natural resource exploitation and land grab-
bing to be classed as genocide. One evidentiary burden would be to
fulfill and prove certain elements of the crime of genocide which
requires ‘‘specific intent of exterminating one ethnic group.’’187 In
particular, even if acts such as ‘‘killing members of the group’’
(committed via an environmental medium) could in principle meet
the actus reus element of the crime of genocide, it would still be
challenging for the ICC prosecutor to establish that an environmental
offence intended to ‘‘destroy a group.’’ Hence it has been suggested
that defining international environmental crimes as crimes against
humanity could prove more meaningful in that it covers many of the
same acts that would normally fall under the rubric of genocide, but
without the higher scienter element of demonstrating a ‘‘specific in-
tent to destroy one ethnic group.’’188 Indeed, ‘‘knowledge of the at-
tack’’ is the mens rea required for the establishment of the crime
against humanity. This appears to encompass acts committed not
only with intention but also with recklessness, which tends to be the
case with a considerable number of environmental offences. Yet the
ability of the OTP to prosecute crimes against humanity committed
via reckless acts appear to be limited considering the history of
negotiations of the Rome Statute. As noted by William Schabas,
during the negotiations of the ICC Statute state parties saw little
reason to define recklessness ‘‘as it is not an element in the definition
of any of the offences within the jurisdiction of the court.’’189 In this
regard, in the Ntganda Trial judgment the court stated that:
186 See for example Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Judgement on
the Appeal of the Prosecutor against the Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application
for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/
05-01/09, AC 3 February 2010. For a commentary see for example Philippa Webb,
‘‘Binocular Vision: State Responsibility and Individual Criminal Responsibility for
Genocide’’, in Larissa van den Herik and Carsten Stahn (eds), The Diversification
and Fragmentation of International Criminal Law (Brill, 2012).
187 See Article 2 (e) of the Genocide Convention prohibits measures with ‘‘intent
to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.’’
188 See Sharp above note 131, at. 236.
189 William Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (CUP,
2011) at 236.
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The Chamber agrees with previous rulings that the phrase will occur in the
ordinary course of events’ as laid down in Article 30(2)(b) and (3) of the
Statute which requires virtual certainty’190 Accordingly, any lower threshold,
such as dolus eventualis, recklessness and negligence, is insufficient to establish
intent’ and knowledge’ in relation to a consequence under Article 30(2)(b).’191
Another significant limitation of classifying environmental offences
as genocide (or crimes against humanity) is that these crimes require a
specific result (e.g. ‘‘killing members of the group’’), but it would not
allow the prosecution for conduct which is potentially harmful to the
environment or human health. This is a significant limitation in
particular in light of the central role played by the precautionary
principle under international environmental law.192 Still, there is one
precedent in the ICC’s own practice for this. In the context of the Al
Bashir arrest warrant, the Pre-Trial Chamber found a nexus between
the underlying environmental harm (water contamination) and the
crime of genocide.193 The Chamber noted that:
one of the reasonable conclusions that can be drawn is that the acts of con-
tamination of water pumps and forcible transfer coupled by resettlement by
member of other tribes, were committed in furtherance of the genocidal policy,
and that the conditions of life inflicted on the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa
groups were calculated to bring about the physical destruction of a part of
those ethnic groups.’194
190 Lubanga Appeal Judgment, paras 447 to 450; Katanga Trial Judgment, paras
774 to 777; Bemba et al. Trial Judgment, para. 29; and Bemba Confirmation Deci-
sion, paras 357 to 369)
191 See, Ntganda, ftn. 2348
192 See e.g. Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (1992).
See furthere.g.N.deSadeleer (ed.), Implementing thePrecautionaryPrinciple:Approaches from
theNordicCountries,EUandUSA (Earthscan,2007);E.Fisher,J.JonesandR.vanSchomberg
(eds.), Implementing the Precautionary Principle: Perspectives and Prospects (Edward Elgar,
2006); M. Fitzmaurice, Contemporary Issues in International Environmental Law (Edward
Elgar, 2009); E. Hey, ‘‘The Precautionary Concept in Environmental Policy and Law: Insti-
tutionalizing Caution,’’ 4Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 2 (1992) 303.
193 In this case the defendant has allegedly committed genocide for having destroyed
‘‘all the target groups’ means of survival, poison sources of water including communal
wells, destroy water pumps, steal livestock and strip the towns and villages of house-
hold and community assets’’. See, Situation InDarfur, Sudan The Prosecutor V. Omar
Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir: Second Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a
Warrant ofArrest, ICC-02/05-01/09, 12 July 2010. See also PublicRedactedVersion of
the Prosecutor’s Application under Article 58, Situation in Darfur (ICC-02/05-157-
AnxA), OTP, 14 July 2008, x 14. See further Cusato, n. 19, at 9.
194 Ibid. para. 38
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In light of those considerations, the Chamber found that there were
reasonable grounds to believe that the elements of the crime of
genocide by deliberately inflicting on members of the target group
conditions of life calculated to bring about the group’s physical
destruction, as provided for in article 6(c) of the ICC Statute, were
fulfilled.195
3.3 Evaluation of the Potential for OTP Prosecutions for Environ-
mental Damage in the Context of the Existing International
Crimes
It is clear from the above analysis that although it is possible in
principle for individual criminal liability to be assigned for environ-
mental damage under the existing crimes covered by the Rome Sta-
tute, the main limitation is that the prohibited acts of ‘‘ecocide’’
would amount to a serious crimes against persons, committed
through environmental means.196 Hence ecocide would be conceived
primarily from an anthropocentric perspective. This helps to explain
why, beyond the academic discourse, there has been little policy de-
bate on enforcing environmental rights under the rubric of crimes
against humanity or genocide.
The above analysis suggests that it would be difficult for the ICC
to bring effective prosecutions against international crimes involving
environmental damage which fall under the umbrella of the existing
crimes recognized under the ICC Statute beyond the limited context
of war crimes. Moreover, it has been suggested that ‘‘even if the
International Criminal Court is inclined to pursue environmental
damage from an internal armed conflict, the specific standards and
norms are unclear, and the danger exists that a person might be
charged for something he or she did not know was a crime.’’197 It
could be argued that this runs contrary to the principle of legality,
which requires that international (criminal) norms are clearly defined.
Thus the principle of legality is a barrier to the prosecution of
international environmental crimes committed under the umbrella of
the existing ICC Statute crimes, such as crimes against humanity or
genocide.
195 Ibid, para. 39.
196 See e.g. Article 7 (1) (k) of the Rome Statute. See also, Pereira, above note 38.
197 Carl Bruch, ‘‘All’s Not Fair in (Civil) War: Criminal Liability for Environ-
mental Damage in Internal Armed Conflict’’ (2001) 25 Vermont Law Review 695, at
736. See also, Rauxloh (2011) above note 83, at 446.
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It is to be hoped that that the implementation of the 2016 OTP
policy paper – and the eventual prosecution by the ICC of the limited
range of environmental crimes currently falling under the Rome
Statute – will bring some clarity to the scope of the court’s existing
jurisdiction in this area. Yet an eventual amendment to the ICC
Statute establishing a specific ‘‘crime against the environment’’ (be-
yond the context of war crimes and other existing international
crimes)198 would make the principle of criminalisation clearer to the
regulated community, increasing deterrence and therefore would be
more consistent with the legality and fair labelling principles.
3.4 The Quest for Corporate Accountability for Ecocide
As was discussed above the ICC currently only has jurisdiction over
international crimes committed by individuals, and not States. But
another significant limitation of the ICC Statute is that it currently
does not recognise the concept of criminal liability of corporations
for international crimes. 199Although there were proposals at the
Rome Conference that led to the adoption of the ICC Statute to
include a regime for criminal liability of legal entities, those proposals
were rejected. 200 Indeed, direct corporate accountability would
necessitate an amendment to art 25 of the ICC Statute, which gives
the ICC authority only over human actors.201 Hence one important
limitation of the ICC jurisdiction is that it can exercise little scrutiny
198 Rauxloh (2011), above n. 77, at 445–446.
199 See, e.g., Rome Statute of the ICC, UN Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (1998); 2187
UNTS 90, Arti. 25(1): ‘‘The Court shall have jurisdiction over natural persons
pursuant to this Statute.’’ Neither the ad hoc tribunals (ICTY and ICTR) nor the
hybrid tribunals set up to try international crimes (SCSL, ECCC) provide jurisdic-
tion over legal persons.
200 See Frederic Megret, ‘‘The Problem of an International Criminal Law of the
Environment’’, 36 Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 2 (2011) at 225; Andrew
Clapham, ‘‘The Complexity of International Criminal Law: Looking Beyond Indi-
vidual Responsibility to the Responsibility of Organisations, Corporations and
States’’, in Ramesh Thakur & Peter Malcontent (eds.), From Sovereignty Impunity
to International Accountability: The Search for Justice in a World of States 233,
245–226 (2004); and Larissa Van den Herik and Letnar Jernej, ‘‘Regulating Cor-
porations under International Law From Human Rights to International Criminal
Law and Back Again’’, 8 Journal of International Criminal Justice 3 (2010), 725–743.
201 David Scheffer, ‘‘Corporate Liability under the Rome Statute’’ (2016) 57
Harvard International Law Journal 35, 38. See Danwood Mzikenge Chirwa, ‘‘The
Doctrine of State Responsibility as a Potential Means of Holding Private Actors
Accountable for Human Rights’’ (2004) 5Melbourne Journal of International Law 1.
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over the role of corporations in international crimes.202 Yet one
commentator suggested that while the 2016 OTP Policy Paper will
not change the ICC’s jurisdiction over corporate crimes, it may
encourage the prosecution of business officials, which would be an
important development from the perspective of business and human
rights.203 In this vein, corporate ‘‘aiding and abetting’’ could be part
of a framework for holding corporate officers accountable for vio-
lations of international criminal law.204
It is anticipated that the lack of jurisdiction over corporate crimes
will represent a considerable barrier to the effective prosecution of
ecocide by the ICC, which is of concern especially considering that
corporations are responsible for the majority of environmental of-
fences. Corporate responsibility for environmental damage and ille-
gal natural resources exploitation is also endemic not only in the
peacetime context but also in internal and international armed con-
flicts in resource-rich countries which have led to major human rights
violations around the world.205
Therefore, an extension of the ICC jurisdiction would have limited
scope to the context of the operations of multinational corporations
and other economic operators in the environmental and natural re-
sources sectors, as they are often able to shield behind the corporate
veil which represents a significant barrier to effective prosecutions.
This is also complicated by the separation of legal personality be-
202 Nadia Bernaz, ‘‘An Analysis of the ICC Office of the Prosecutor’s Policy Paper
on Case Selection and Prioritization from the Perspective of Business and Human
Rights’’, JICJ 15 (2017), 527–542
203 Ibid.
204 ‘‘The ICJ Expert Panel has taken the view that a company official who knows
that his acts will facilitate, encourage or provide moral support for the commission
of a crime and nonetheless proceeds, will be in grave danger of being held criminally
accountable for aiding and abetting.’ See further, Corporate Complicity & Legal
Accountability: Report of the International Commission of Jurists Expert Legal
Panel on Corporate Complicity in International Crimes’’, (2008) ICJ, vol. 2(‘‘ICJ
Report’’),
205 Ken Roberts, Corporate Liability and Complicity in International Crimes, in
in Sebastien Jodoin and Marie-Claire Condonier Segger (eds), Sustainable Devel-
opment, International Criminal Justice and Treaty Interpretation (CUP, 2013) For
example, the participation of corporations in the ‘‘blood diamond’’ trade came to
international attention in the late 1990 s and early 2000 s. as illustrated by gold
mining companies which have provided financial and logistical support to rebel
groups known for committing human rights atrocities in the DRC’s Ituri region. See
ibid. See also, L. M. Ocampo, ‘‘Second Assembly of States Parties to the Rome
Statute of the ICC: Report of the Prosecutor of the ICC 4’’ (2003).
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tween parent companies and subsidiaries recognized in many legal
systems which limit the effectiveness of civil remedies available to
local communities and for remediation of the environment. This
further illustrates the limitations of the current penalties and remedies
predicated in the Rome Statute which often fail to reflect the remedies
and penalties regarded to be effective for the enforcement of national
environmental laws such as environmental remediation, as well as
penalties more specific to corporate entities in particular license
revocation and corporate probation orders.206 This limitation in pe-
nalties and remedies is particularly striking given that unlike the other
international criminal tribunals before it, corrective and reparative
justice is one of the distinguishing characteristics of the ICC.207
As was discussed above the International Law Commission since
its sixty-fifth session in 2013 has been working on the topic of the
‘‘protection of the environment in relation to armed conflicts’’ and an
outcome document endorsed by the UN General Assembly has at-
tempted to clarify the circumstances in which corporations may be
held liable for illegal natural resources exploitation and environ-
mental damage.208 Under the ‘‘Draft principles on protection of the
environment in relation to armed conflicts, adopted by the Commission
on first reading,’’ Principle 10 on ‘‘Corporate Due Diligence’’ states
that States should take appropriate legislative and other measures
‘‘aimed at ensuring that corporations and other business enterprises
operating in or from their territories exercise due diligence with re-
spect to the protection of the environment, including in relation to
human health, when acting in an area of armed conflict or in a post-
armed conflict situation.’’ Moreover, the principle of corporate
accountability is embedded in Principle 11 which directs States to
‘‘take appropriate legislative and other measures aimed at ensuring
that corporations and other business enterprises operating in or from
their territories can be held liable for harm caused by them to the
206 See also, Eliana Cusato, ‘‘Beyond Symbolism: Problems and Prospects of
Prosecuting Environmental Destruction before the ICC’’, 15 Journal of International
Criminal Justice 3 (2017), pp. 491–507. On the role of reparations under international
criminal law, see Pubudu Sachithanandan, Reparations for Victims and Sustainable
Development, in Sebastien Jodoin and Marie-Claire Condonier Segger (eds), Sus-
tainable Development, International Criminal Justice and Treaty Interpretation (CUP,
2013).
207 See International Criminal Court, Establishment of a Fund for Victims of
Crimes, UN Doc ICC-ASP/1/Res.6, para 8. See also, Mwanza, above note 20.
208 See further, Marie G. Jacobsson, above note 146
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environment, including in relation to human health, in an area of
armed conflict or in a post-armed conflict situation.’’209
Even though there is considerable academic debate on whether
criminal sanctions are effective or indeed necessary when applied to
corporate entities,210 it is submitted that the accountability of cor-
porations should be recognized under the ICC Statute. In particular,
powerful international non-state actors currently face limited risk of
accountability under the national laws of some host states – and
limited or no liability under international law – would have to act
more diligently in the host countries where they operate. This is
particularly the case of multinationals corporations,211 but this
should also apply to international financial institutions which fund
projects that damage the environment.212. This view is echoed by
Regina Rauxloh who argues that:
Given the significant contribution of corporate actors to global environmental
problems, the inclusion of legal persons within the gamut of international
criminal liability would provide an avenue to end to the facto immunity which
multinational corporations enjoy for the most serious environmental dam-
age.’213
Yet as not all legal systems recognise the criminal liability of cor-
porations, it would be challenging for the ICC Statute to reconcile
those disparate approaches concerning the assignment of criminal
responsibility to corporate entities.214
209 See ibid. Principles 10 and Principle 11.
210 See for example Gary Slapper and Steve Tombs, Corporate Crime (Longman,
1999); John Coffee, ‘‘No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick: an Unscandalized Inquiry
into the Problem of Corporate Punishment’’, MichLR, 1980–1981; and V.S.
Khanna, ‘‘Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does it Serve?’’ (1996) 109
Harvard Law Review 7.
211 See further, Janet Dine, Companies, International Trade and Human Rights
(CUP, 2010).
212 See further, A. Hardenbrook, ‘‘Equator Principles: The Private Financial
Sector’s Attempt at Environmental Responsibility’’, 40 Vand. J. Transnat’L K. 197
(2007).
213 Rauxloh, above note 83, 432–434.
214 See John Coffee, ‘‘Corporate Criminal Liability: an Introduction and Com-
parative Survey’’, in Albin Eser/Gu nter Heine/Barbara Huberhttp e.d. Criminal
Responsibility of Legal and Collective Entities, International Colloquium Berlin
(1998).
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IV CONCLUDING REMARKS
Although the ICC OTP 2016 policy guidance on case selection and
prioritisation is a positive development, it has so far not brought a
major change to the status quo. Fundamentally, it does not change
the current position that environmental crime may be regarded as
serious crimes under national law but not under international law
outside the limited existing ICC jurisdiction over environmental
crime. Still, by emphasizing the seriousness of environmental damage,
illegal natural resources exploitation and land grabbing in the context
of the ICC’s existing crimes, the ICC prosecutor’s policy guidance
could be regarded as an important step towards the establishment of
a crime of ecocide under international law. But the first more
immediate legal implications of the ICC OTP policy paper are that it
may trigger the court to clarify not only the scope of the ‘‘environ-
mental’’ war crime under Article 8 (2)(b)(iv), but also whether the
illegal exploitation of natural resources in conflict situations could
amount to ‘‘pillage’’ and therefore to a war crime under Article 8 (2)
(b) (xvi). Yet it is less likely that those developments will lead the ICC
in the near future to recognize that ecocide falls under the definition
of genocide or crimes against humanity, as there are only a limited
number of scenarios in which this would be possible given the high
threshold required for establishing those offences.
But despite the excitement of some international environmental
and criminal lawyers, academics and NGOs following the publication
of the OTP policy paper, as of March 2020 (i.e. three and a half years
since the publication of the 2016 OTP policy paper), no investigations
or prosecutions have been initiated by the OTP for war crimes, crimes
against humanity or genocide in which environmental damage, illegal
natural resources exploitation or land grabbing were regarded to be
aggravating circumstances in the case selection and investigation
criterion.215 It is also not encouraging that two recent Communica-
tions brought before the OTP have not led to preliminary examina-
tions, that is the large scale governmental land grabbing in Cambodia
and the ‘‘Lago Agrio Victims’’ victims for alleged crimes against
humanity committed in Ecuador, even though it is difficult to
ascertain the overall success rate of the Communications filed before
215 See ICC OTC Report on Preliminary Examinations Activities (2018), available
at https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/181205-rep-otp-PE-ENG.pdf. See also,
OTC Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2019, 5 December 2019 https://
www.icccpi.int/itemsDocuments/191205-rep-otp-PE.pdf (accessed 30 March 2020)
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of the OTP as they commonly are not publicised. Moreover, the
illegal exploitation of natural resources played a minor role in Bosco
Ntaganda’s conviction by the ICC in July 2019 for crimes against
humanity, and the charges for the war crime of pillage related to
enemy property but these did not involve illegal exploitation of
natural resources, and in any event those charges were dismissed by
the court. In addition, the mandate of the incumbent ICC prosecutor,
Ms Fatou Bensouda, expires in early 2021 (i.e. 9 years since her
appointment in December 2011), and it is not clear whether the new
ICC prosecutor will pursue a similar policy guidance on case selection
and prioritization.
It is to be hoped that if the ICC OTP eventually brings successful
prosecutions concerning illegal natural resource exploitation, envi-
ronmental damage and land grabbing in the circumstances envisaged
in the OTP 2016 policy paper, then a particularly strong case could be
made for the court to have a broader jurisdiction over ecocide in
post-conflict and peacetime scenarios. With the recent unfortunate
passing of a world leading advocate for the recognition of an inter-
national crime of ecocide, and with the recent rise of some populist
and nationalist governments and political parties that have a low
environmental protection record and little or no regard for envi-
ronmental concerns, it is to be hoped that civil society and other
stakeholders concerned will continue to get mobilized to call on law
and policy makers to advance the case for creation of an international
crime of ecocide. I have previously argued that although there are
strong arguments for extending the ICC jurisdiction over ecocide,216
the ICC jurisprudence and OTP practices needed further testing.217
Although the 2016 OTC Policy Paper provided a promising basis for
testing the court’s jurisdiction, unfortunately so far it is difficult to
make a strong case for extending the court’s jurisdiction over ecocide
on the basis of the prosecutorial and jurisprudential practices that
have followed the publication of the 2016 OTC Policy Paper.
216 See in particular, Higgins, above note 2; and Mwanza, above note 20.
217 Pereira, R. Environmental Criminal Liability and Enforcement in European
and International Law’ (Brill, 2015). See also, Mistura, above note 122.
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